In this paper, we argue that there are patterns of innovation occurring in less economically developed countries (LEDCs) that have been historically overlooked by the innovation studies literature, including the literature on innovation systems and the triple helix. This paper briefly surveys cases in agriculture, banking, biomedicine and information and communications technologies that demonstrate organizational, scientific and technological innovation in Africa, South Asia, and Brazil. In particular, we track new developments in two distinctive patterns within LEDCs: (1) civil society as a site of innovation and; (2) innovation through appropriation. By systematically uncovering patterns of innovation in LEDCs, science and technology policy scholars may make new theoretical gains in innovation studies that can potentially contribute to innovation policies in the global South.
INTRODUCTION
Science and technology policy studies have been centrally involved with understanding processes of innovation. Here we broadly define innovation as changes in organizational processes (as well as quality, safety and management sciences) that facilitate the production of technology, science and services. While we recognize that innovation is commonly meant to refer to changes in products themselves, collapsing the definition of innovation into that of mere invention conceals much conceptual richness (Mytelka 2000) . As the role of innovation in catalyzing economic development has become increasingly appreciated by scholars and policy makers alike, the importance of science and technology policy studies for development has become progressively more obvious (Lorentzen 2010; Metcalfe and Ramlogan 2008; Viotti 2002) . However, innovation in developing countries is subject to different challenges of capital and infrastructure than innovation in industrialized nations; therefore it cannot necessarily be explained by the same concepts used to explain innovation in developed countries (Lorentzen 2010; Metcalfe and Ramlogan 2008; Mytelka 2000) .
While innovation in less economically developed countries i (LEDCs) is a topic that we believe is neglected by science and technology policy scholars, this was not always the case. For example, during Minerva's first decade (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) , 105 out of 400 articles explicitly dealt with LEDCs, while in 2010 and 2011 only one such article has appeared. During that first decade, science and technology policy scholars thought that LEDCs did not have enough resources and expertise to solve their developmental problems; they needed to educate their elite in the West, and technocrats from Europe and America needed to advise them on how to grow the economy. For example, the first editors of Minerva stated that in all of Africa and Asia (except for India), there was not sufficient scientific community "capable of sustaining a public opinion appreciative of the accomplishments and value of modern scientific and scholarly research" (The Editors 1962) , and they encouraged the top students from LEDCs to study in Europe and America so that they could return to their home countries and train the population (Moravcsik 1966 ).
Our analysis begins by highlighting three factors that are important to consider in understanding innovation in less economically developed countries. Firstly, the mainstream economic framework imposed on LEDCs by the "Washington Consensus" (i.e. the World Bank, IMF, G8, etc.) focused on neoliberal structural adjustment policies. These policies were imposed based upon the (often incorrect) assumption that they would enhance economic, science and technology development of the LEDCs (Harvey 2005; Kamat 2002; Metcalfe and Ramlogan 2008; McMichael 2000) . Neoliberal structural adjustment policies involved a rolling back of government provided services in LEDCs (Peck and Tickell 2002) , in the belief that such services should or would be provided through the private sector. In the absence of a robust private sector, this often meant a proliferation of domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) providing services.
These NGOS are typically funded by private donations, international NGOs (INGOs), foreign governments, or the United Nations. Secondly, a small number of countries (East Asian "Tigers") proved adept at linking an emergent innovation capacity to economic growth (Hou and Gee 1993; Kim 1997 ); subsequently they have earned the misnomer ii of newly industrialized nations. Thirdly, new intellectual frameworks for understanding the role of science, technology, and innovation in development were emerging from a number of disciplines to explain such innovation capacity in industrialized and newlyindustrialized nations.
Indeed, since the 1980s, scholarship leading to concepts such as "innovation systems"
and the "triple helix" has offered a challenge to neoliberal economics by revealing complex institutional dynamics behind economic development that were not acknowledged, let alone addressed, by "structural adjustment." However, this work was created primarily using comparative case studies of the wealthy countries of the global north. In a literature survey that specifically focused on innovation studies of low-income countries (or the world's 'bottom billion' people) between 1997 and 2008, Lorentzen argues that while innovation is occurring in low-income countries, the analyses of such innovation by scholars are sporadic, country-specific (instead of comparative) and demonstrate idiosyncrasies (instead of elucidating patterns; 2010). Absent from this sparse yet diverse literature has been any systematic theoretical or analytical approach, especially in regard to key questions of: local capabilities, linkages between different sites of innovation, and distinct forms of learning (Lorentzen 2010) .
In this paper, we will discuss two patterns of innovation in less economically developed countries that we believe are important in this regard: non-governmental organizations as strong innovators, and governments as innovators through technological appropriation.
To illustrate the patterns we have identified four cases of innovation in: agriculture, banking, biomedicine and information and communications technologies (ICTs) in the global south.
Innovation Systems and Triple Helix
Neoclassical economic approaches to studying innovation tend to neglect the importance of institutions (especially those related to scientific and technological capacity) and to treat all innovators as if they were rational agents (Lundvall ed. 2010 (Lundvall ed. [1992 ). Innovation systems and triple helix approaches have offered a corrective to these blind spots, but we argue that they should be broadened to include more discussion of the third/ civil society/ voluntary sector as a site of innovation.
Research on innovation systems has focused on multiple actors including governments, universities, industry and capital to explain innovation at the macro level (Dosi et al eds.
1988 ; Lundvall ed. 2010 Lundvall ed. [1992 ; Nelson ed. 1993) . Innovation requires learning formally through research and development and informally through organizational activities and the creation of intraorganizational linkages (Lundvall ed. 2010 (Lundvall ed. [1992 ). The innovation systems perspective is valuable because, if deployed correctly, it can go beyond capital and markets to look at the context in which innovation is embedded including universities and government (Lundvall ed. 2010 (Lundvall ed. [1992 ).
The triple helix concept posits that the previously siloed institutions of state, university, and industry frequently interact, and that there are important intersections where hybridized forms of organizational work occur (Etzkowitz and Leyesdorff 2000). The triple helix concept suggests that innovation occurs in a nonlinear process through systems that are always in an endless transition (Etzkowitz and Leyesdorff 1998, 2000) .
Innovation system analyses include the history of markets and the importance of organizational learning in firms, between firms, etc. for the maintenance and growth of the system (Lundvall ed. 2010 (Lundvall ed. [1992 ; Nelson and Winter 1985) . For example, with the new knowledge economy the university is more important not because it is a primary site where knowledge is produced, but as Metcalfe (2010) argues, because universities serve as a central space for informal contacts and social networking.
One weakness of the innovation systems concept is that it does not fully address patterns of innovation that are more commonly found in less economically developed countries.
Innovation systems literature has little attended to system-building in the global south, the power dynamics of learning, and how innovation can be environmentally sustainable (Lundvall ed. 2010 (Lundvall ed. [1992 ). Innovation systems scholarship has also neglected serviceproviding non-governmental organizations (NGOs), advocacy organizations, member associations, and other civil society organizations in the innovation process (Krishna and Turpin 2007) , in favor of a strong focus on firms, universities, and governments. This oversight is particularly acute given the increasing importance of non-governmental organizations in innovation and development in LEDCs.
PATTERNS OF INNOVATION IN LEDCS
In this section, we briefly explore how science and innovation policy studies can be enriched, particularly with respect to LEDCs, through insights from science and technology studies scholarship focusing on domestic NGOs as innovators dependent upon external/foreign funding (Shrum 2000) , and on professional users as innovators through technological appropriation in LECs (Odumosu 2009 (Odumosu , 2011 Williams 2011) . Our four cases in agriculture, biomedicine, banking, and ICTs examine INGOs versus country-based domestic NGOs on regional innovation (pattern 1), and public-private partnerships versus self-funding on country-specific innovation (pattern 2). Recognizing NGOs as strong innovators (pattern 1) and governments as innovators through appropriation (pattern 2) will be important to effectively shape science, technology and innovation policy of the future within LEDCs. 
INGO Implements Market-led Technology as Agricultural Innovation in Africa
The One key scientific effort that AGRA also funds is plant breeding research. Plant breeding is at the core of developing healthy and plentiful crops that have high yields and that are pest and disease resistant. AGRA has funded research on a variety of African staple crops such as maize, rice, sorghum, and cassava (Blaustein 2008 ) and other crops iv including soybeans, cowpeas, banana and teff.
AGRA's combination of international political prestige and robust financial support creates potential to shape African agriculture policy and research and help African farmers be more innovative. As an example of their political prestige, the chairman of AGRA's board is Kofi Annan, the former United Nations Secretary General (AGRA 2011). Annan has traveled around the world explaining the necessity of small farmers and his stature has given him access to a variety of forums and world leaders (AGRA 2011).
Similarly the large amount, and long-term consistency, of financial support from the Gates and Rockefeller foundations may help AGRA be successful where past attempts to catalyze a green revolution in Africa have failed (Toenniesen, Adesina, and DeVries
2008).
In summary, AGRA is adopting an integrated approach to becoming a strong regional innovator, instead of focusing on individual developing countries. It develops agri-food markets, supports small farmers, funds scientific research, and gives out education scholarships. Thus it performs many of the functions of the actors in the triple helix, and as such it represents a model for LEDC innovation that deserves further study by innovation scholars seeking to better understand and encourage innovation at the regional scale in the global south.
South Asian Self-Sufficient NGOs Produce Local High-Technology
The Indian NGO, Aravind Eye Care System, and the Nepali NGO, Tilganga Institute of Ophthalmology, have created many innovations to provide the poor with cataract surgery v . Aravind was founded in 1976 by Dr. Govindappa Venkataswamy. It grew from eleven beds in his in-law's house to a six-hospital system in southern India thirty years later. Tilganga was founded in 1994 by Dr. Sanduk Ruit to focus on cataract disease; by 2012 it had grown to a two-building complex with additional ophthalmology subspecialties.
A key innovation for Aravind is their cost recovery model, which makes them self sufficient for operational expenses. The model includes three main sources of revenue:
the sliding scale fee payment system; the local production and sales of ophthalmic products; and the training of other public health professionals. The sliding scale fee payment system allows more affluent patients to pay a higher cost and receive more amenities for their cataract surgery. The fees charged to the wealthy (40% of patients) then provide free (or subsidized) eye care services (including surgery) to the poor (60% of patients). Remarkably, Aravind does not require that patients supply proof of poverty (Rubin 2007 (Shrum 2000) . Although this research was successful, Shamba found that too many linkages to other institutions and funders put pressure on their organization; eventually the participatory agricultural research followed the funding to a different split off NGO (Shrum 2000) .
The two cases we have described (see Table 1 below for a summary) demonstrate the potentially distinctive role of INGOs and NGOs as sources of 'high-tech' organizational, scientific, and technological innovation in regions that are less economically developed.
These cases cannot be accommodated or explained by standard innovation system models derived from study of wealthy industrialized nations with access to capital and good (government maintained) infrastructure.
Further exploration of the role of NGOs as strong innovators may also be applicable in wealthy industrialized nations as they increasingly struggle to develop economically and environmentally sustainable innovation in domains such as general medicine and energy production and distribution. Other innovation studies have examined the relationship between professional users and the firms who provide them with products and services (e.g., von Hippel, 2004; Lundvall 2009 Lundvall [1988 ). More recent work focused on the global south has conceptualized users as highly educated professionals consuming high-technology and science in LEDCs; these professional users develop the additional expertise to become producers in a process of constitutive appropriation (Odumosu 2009 (Odumosu , 2011 and cosmopolitan appropriation (Williams 2011).
Below are two case studies that exemplify technological appropriation by governments.
In our first case, a Kenyan telecom company (primarily owned by the Kenyan government) creates a unique mobile banking system targeted for Kenyans who cannot access traditional banking services. The second case briefly examines how the Brazilian government developed open source software that was more cost effective and better matched its needs than proprietary commercial software. In the Brazilian case in particular, the government has to maneuver around the constraints of international commerce and law to protect domestic industry.
Public-Private Partnership Reinvents Mobile Banking for Low-income Kenyans
M-Pesa is a Kenyan mobile banking system that was started in 2007 as a public-private partnership between Safaricom vii and Vodafone. M stands for mobile and pesa is a Many politicians, especially those who opposed Lula da Silva and also favored neoliberal approaches to government, argued that the new policy hurt the country's prospects for developing profitable technology because OSS was free and the government could not profit from the technology that was developed (Richter et al. 2009; Shaw 2010) . Amadeu said that Microsoft used drug dealer tactics to hook Brazil on its product, and in retaliation, Microsoft sued him for slander. The slander case was eventually dropped by the Brazilian courts, but it illustrates the high stakes for software companies and the Brazilian government (Richter et al. 2009; Shaw 2010 In the cases that illustrate patter #2 (summarized in Table 
CHALLENGE FOR SCIENCE POLICY SCHOLARS
Above we have described two new patterns of innovation that extend insights described in previous work by innovation studies scholars by looking at new agents and areas:
NGOs as strong regional innovators and governments as producers through appropriation. In the first pattern, INGOs and NGOs are strong regional innovators who develop local and regional linkages, and make use of domestic experts and international funding, while creating innovative organizational processes, scientific techniques and technological products. In the second pattern, individual country governments are funded through partnerships with private industry, or self-funded; these governments create context-specific innovations that address a particular national need at low cost. In presenting only four cases, of course, the generality of these patterns remains a challenge for additional research, but our findings complement and add to similarly enlightening 
CONCLUSION
In 2010, Lorentzen advised that new work on low-income countries should be conducted on the connection between external technology transfer and local innovation diffusion, and on community/ participatory/ user-driven innovation. In this paper, we add more focus and direction to this call, and challenge science and technology policy scholars to address distinctive patterns of innovation in LEDCs: the role of NGOs as strong innovators, and of governments as innovators through appropriation. By describing four specific cases in agriculture, biomedicine, banking and ICTs, we have sought to make clear how innovation activities and dynamics in LEDCs may lie outside of the current conceptual mapping and explanatory frameworks of innovation systems and triple helix.
Our view is that that because the intellectual and analytical foundations of innovation systems analysis were largely developed in reference to industrialized and newly industrialized countries, they are inadequate for understanding some of the most interesting aspects of innovation in LEDCs. Such inadequacies may lead to flawed policy prescriptions that dissuade innovators in LEDCs from developing novel and contextually appropriate solutions to their problems (e.g., see Viotti 2002 ). While we could only offer a few cases, we hope that they are sufficiently rich to stimulate deeper and more creative investigations of innovation in LEDCS. Until more work is developed that systematically determines patterns using individual country and regional comparisons, the role of innovation in the economic development of LEDCs, with their challenges of constrained resources and poor infrastructure, will remain inadequately understood, and the potential 
